Climate change poses a global challenge, but many of the most ambitious and innovative efforts to confront it have emerged from the sub-state level. While such action has received significant attention in North America, less attention has been paid to European sub-state nations and regions, even though several of these regions are at the forefront of policy efforts to reduce carbon emissions and promote renewable energy. This article begins to fill that knowledge gap. It explores the puzzle as to why, and how, given their more limited scope for policy action, some sub-state governments position themselves as 'climate pioneers'. The article undertakes a heuristic case study of Scotland, which has developed a particularly ambitious climate change and renewable energy programme. Drawing on public policy literature, we use the case study to consider the extent to which such ambition is enabled by constitutional and fiscal capacity, facilitated by a cohesive policy network, and motivated by economic and political goals. While we find evidence of these enabling features in the Scottish case, we argue that understanding sub-state climate action also necessitates examining such action through the lens of territorial politics.
INTRODUCTION
National governments have struggled to agree comprehensive and binding targets to tackle global climate change. UN climate summits have fallen well short of achieving the strong, integrated, international action most scientists argue is necessary to address the impacts of continued global climate change. Below the international and national level, however, climate action is vibrant. In particular, sub-state nations and regions have grown to be significant players in recent years, with many developing their own initiatives to combat climate change. Such efforts have received growing academic attention in the United States, where innovations among US states and cities are well-documented (Burke and Ferguson, 2010; Engel, 2009; Moser, 2007; Pitt, 2010; Rabe, 2008; . Far less attention has been paid to climate change policy among sub-state governments in
Europe. Yet, these governments play a key role in facilitating (or hampering) the climate change mitigation targets set by decision-makers at a higher level, including European Union (EU) programmes and directives. Moreover, many sub-state governments in Europe have not confined themselves to the role of implementers of policy set by higher authorities; several of Europe's leading legislative regions have assumed the role of what we call 'climate pioneers' -actors who develop initiatives that entail markedly more ambitious policy goals and further practical policy experimentation than usually found at the national or supranational level (Galarraga, et al. 2011; Hoffman, 2011) .
In this article, we seek to explore climate ambition at the sub-state level by undertaking a heuristic case study of Scotland, one of Europe's leading sub-state nations at the forefront of policy initiatives designed to mitigate climate change and encourage a transition to a low carbon economy. We focus on two areas of policy output -emissions reduction and renewable energywhere the Scottish Government has been especially ambitious. Legislative devolution was introduced to Scotland in 1999, establishing a Scottish Parliament with legislative autonomy over a wide range of domestic policies, including some policy fields linked to climate change.
However, in Scotland, as elsewhere, climate change policy defies strict constitutional demarcations. Scottish policy is shaped -and often limited -by the resources, decisions and parameters set by national and supranational authorities. The level of activity of, and priority given by, the Scottish government in this sphere makes Scotland an interesting study in its own right.
However, we also use our case study to explore the puzzle as to why, and how, given their more limited scope for policy action, some sub-state governments have positioned themselves at the forefront of pioneering policy initiatives intended to mitigate climate change. What resources do sub-state governments have at their disposal to facilitate policy innovation? Are the motivations behind their policy ambitions similar to those underpinning pioneering behavior among national level front-runners? Or are there particular territorial explanations as to why governments at the sub-state level become climate pioneers?
To address these questions, we develop an analytical framework which identifies the general factors underpinning policy leadership in the climate arena. We draw broadly on public policy literature which presents competing explanations for policy development (see John 2012) , but focus specifically on literature exploring pioneering behaviour in environmental policy among nation-states and in the EU. This literature points towards a broad range of constitutional, economic, social and political factors to explain why some countries are leaders and others lag behind in the environmental and climate policy arena (Héritier, 1996; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Scruggs, 2003) . We adapt these factors to the sub-state level, but suggest that these are likely to provide only a partial account of policy ambition. We anticipate that pioneering behaviour at the sub-state level also requires insights drawn from the literature on territorial politics to highlight the multi-level constraints shaping policy development, and the territorial ambitions and resources driving innovation. Our case study examines the explanatory potential of each of the factors highlighted in the analytical framework. In so doing, we find that adapting existing explanations can go some way to explaining climate ambition in Scotland, but we also argue that pioneering behavior is also a useful means by which the Scottish government has asserted its territorial distinctiveness on the national and international stage, and used its natural resource capacities to assert and reinforce the demand for self-government. The article concludes by developing hypotheses that may be applied in other case and comparative studies of climate action among sub-state governments.
UNDERSTANDING SUB-STATE PIONEERS
Numerous studies have sought to explain why some nation-states emerge as pioneers -or 'pacesetters', 'forerunners' or 'first movers' -in environmental and climate policy (Börzel, 2002; Héritier, 1996; Jänicke, 2005; Lenschow, et al., 2005; Liefferink, et al., 2009; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Sbragia, 1996; Scruggs, 2003) . These insights are useful and we incorporate them into our analytical framework. However, they adopt a narrow focus on the nation-state as the core locus of activity. For instance, Jänicke (2005: 132-3) suggests that nation-states are uniquely placed to lead in environmental policy because of their relatively high policy capacity with respect to financial resources, personnel, professional competence and coercive power. But assumptions that national governments, economies and societies are the pre-eminent unit of analysis arguably falls foul of 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002) by taking the nation-state as the natural and most appropriate focus of research, and by ignoring the explicitly multi-level character of this policy field. Wimmer and Glick Schiller bemoaned the obsession of social scientists for describing and examining social and political processes within the 'container' of the nation-state, arguing that as a result they lost sight of the connections between these nationally-bounded territories (2002: 307) . We might equally suggest that such methodological nationalism loses sight of the variations within nation-states, which the rise of regional authority has rendered more visible (Hooghe, et al., 2010; Jeffery and Wincott, 2010) .
Studies of climate action among nation-states remain useful as a starting point to explain why any level of government would become a climate pioneer. To avoid the trap of methodological regionalism and giving undue paramountcy to region-specific features, we draw upon and adapt state-level explanations to the regional level in our framework set out below. Insight can also be gained from the rich pool of environmental federalism literature which has emerged to explain sub-federal climate action in Canada (Harrison 2007; Hoffman 2011; Selin and vanDeveer 2009) and especially in the United States, where the unwillingness of the Bush administration, and the inability of the Obama administration, to make significant headway on climate change mitigation has prompted pioneering activity among numerous states (Derthick 2010; Engel, 2009; Moser, 2007; Posner, 2010; Rabe, 2011) . We draw upon the explanations offered by both of these sets of literature to develop potential explanations for sub-state climate ambition in Europe. However, we supplement these explanations with particular insights drawn from the literature on territorial politics to help explain why some sub-state nations and regions may be particularly inclined to pursue ambitious climate policies and programmes.
Capacity for Action
One of the most important factors contributing to pioneering behavior is the 'capacity for action' (Jänicke, 2005; Liefferink et al., 2009) . Capacity can be defined broadly to include (i) the constitutional authority to act in a given sphere and (ii) the fiscal autonomy to raise revenue and/or direct investment towards policy goals. Applied to the national level, capacity encompasses the legitimate political and jurisdictional authority, knowledge and resource base with which to make policy, the authority to raise revenue or design tax systems towards policy goals, and the abilityformal and informal -to engage and co-operate within international forums, including the EU. At the sub-state level, capacity above refers primarily to regional authority (Hooghe, et al., 2008) which can include both self-rule (regional constitutional competence, policy scope and revenueraising and spending autonomy) and 'shared rule', measured by the formal mechanisms for influencing policy, constitutional and fiscal decisions taken at higher levels. Such capacity varies across states. Some sub-state governments, like the Canadian provinces, have jurisdiction over energy policy, and thus capacity to shape the energy market, while in other nation-states, like the UK, energy policy is mainly the preserve of the national government. In some multi-level states, the primary responsibility of the sub-state level is merely to implement decisions taken at higher levels, limiting the scope for sub-state innovation. By contrast, sub-state governments with high levels of 'shared power', as in Belgium and Germany, can shape, or obstruct, national decision making in a wide range of policy spheres, including those which shape a state's response to climate change.
Economic Motivation
Cross-national comparisons of environmental leaders and laggards have identified strong links between economic development and pioneering behaviour. Indeed, for Börzel, the level of economic development was the key factor determining whether EU member states were at the forefront of environmental policy outputs, especially in the area of environmental regulation (Börzel, 2002; see also Jänicke, 2005) . Literature on state pioneers suggests that environmental pioneers are often motivated by the economic gains that may accrue from being at the forefront of policy development, especially where this involves technological innovation and export opportunities. For example, Denmark and Germany, two of the most prominent environmental 'pioneers' in Europe, were among the first to manufacture on-shore wind turbines. In the field of renewable energy, in particular, states with the greatest natural resource capacity may also be motivated to act as 'renewables pioneers' precisely because of the competitive advantage such investment could bring (Porter, 1990) . These economic motivations are evident at the sub-state level too. Rabe (2011) suggests that US states demonstrating pioneering climate policies have been at least as motivated by the chance to exploit strategic economic advantage as by carbon reduction or broader environmental goals. A similar phenomenon can be observed among city climate champions, who see climate policies as an opportunity for enhancing 'smart growth', as well as potentially generating cost-savings (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Sippel and Jenssen, 2010) .
Policy Networks
Climate and energy innovation is also heavily reliant on the willingness and support of networks of civil society actors, including industry, labour, experts and NGOs. Jänicke (2005) highlighted how expert advice from scientists, economists and engineers can guide governments seeking to set policy goals that are reliant on technological innovation. Scruggs' (2003) suggested innovative or far-reaching environmental action is more likely in states marked by neo-corporatist bargaining between employers, labour unions, industry representatives, and government officials. Such bargaining helps create the consensus needed for environmental innovation and change (see also Liefferink, et al., 2009) . Industry and scientific experts can more directly shape policy action through their participation in influential advisory boards (Liefferink and Anderson, 1998) . More broadly, environmental activists, green parties and NGOs have been identified as important civil society actors expressing and encouraging strong public support for environmental innovation and policy learning (Scruggs, 2003; Lenschow, et al, 2005; Bomberg, 2009) . Civil society's role is often described as taking place within policy networks -collections of stakeholders featuring an informal exchange of information, access and resources (Marsh 1998; Peterson 2009 ). Such informal exchange fosters shared knowledge, compromise and consensus among diverse actors within and beyond government to work collectively to address policy challenges. Most of the policy networks literature focuses on state-wide level activity, but these networks are found at substate level too (Keating et al., 2009) . Indeed, small highly solidaristic nations and regions with a strong shared sense of territorial distinctiveness may be better placed to support interest mediation, compromise and co-operation between key stakeholders by fostering mutual trust and common territorial goals (Rhodes, 1996: 169) .
Multi-level Dynamics
Much of the literature examining pioneering behaviour among national governments in the EU recognizes the multi-level character of this policy arena. Many scholars portray such behaviour as a 'two-level game', aiming not just to spur innovation at home, but also to raise regulatory standards internationally (Börzel, 2002; Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Sbragia, 1996) . Policy pioneers seek 'first mover advantage ' (Héritier, 1994) , to ensure that standards adopted within supranational or international forums reflect their preferences and practices. In the European Union, in particular, ensuring a level playing field in 'their' area of innovation helps pioneers to avoid the costs of legal and institutional adjustments in the wake of EU regulation, while maximizing opportunities for those domestic industries marketing technologies suited to the new regulatory framework (Héritier, 1994: 151; see also Vogel 1995; Halpern, 2010) .
Member-state governments are clearly the key players in EU decision-making, but sub-state governments can also shape European policy-making, sometimes directly through regional offices in Brussels or the Committee of the Regions, but more often indirectly by shaping their memberstate government's negotiating position (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2001 ; Van den Brande, 2011) . In climate policy, in particular, international coalitions of sub-state governments have sought direct access to the European Commission through advocacy groups such as the Climate Group and the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4sd), albeit thus far with limited results (Happaerts, et al., 2010) . Nonetheless, sub-state pioneers clearly participate in a three-level game, seeking the same strategic advantages as other 'first movers' by maximising the domestic opportunities and minimizing implementation costs associated with both national and supranational regulation. Sub-state governments are bound by the international obligations undertaken by their national governments, and are often dependent upon the domestic policy decisions they make with respect to finance and investment in low carbon technologies, the design and regulation of the energy market, or the regulation of domestic energy consumption.
Sub-state activities are not entirely determined by 'higher level' action: a striking feature of multi- This activity has included ambitious emissions reduction programmes among some states, collaborative cap-and-trade schemes and 'renewable portfolio standards' to facilitate and incentivize the transition away from fossil fuels (Burke and Ferguson 2010; Moser, 2007; Rabe, 2008; Kretzschmar and Whitford, 2012) . Such initiatives, notwithstanding their variable degree of success, can serve to jump-start policy action by higher levels of government (Posner, 2010) , or can act as a 'floor', or a 'backstop when the federal government fails to regulate' (Engels, 2009: 450) .
The Politics of Territorial Identity
Our final explanation of sub-state pioneering behaviour emerges not from national level studies, but from the literature on territorial politics. In sub-state nations and regions, debates over the direction of public policy are often shaped by the politics of territorial identity. Governments engaging in policy making within strong identity nations and regions often frame their goals and demands as an opportunity to maximize the region's autonomy and its voice and status within the larger state and beyond. This dynamic is especially strong in those territories where demands for more self-government are high on the political agenda, or where strong sub-state nationalist parties ensure that the territorial cleavage remains at least as strong as more conventional ideological cleavages. By adopting the role of climate pioneer, a sub-state government can reinforce its territory's distinctiveness, assert the political importance of the sub-state level, and use the economic opportunities offered by low carbon innovation and renewables as justification for the pursuit of greater political autonomy. In addition, sub-state governments engaging in international climate forums or networks often see these as opportunities to appear 'state-like', giving them a profile on the world stage as well as enhancing their status with a home audience (Happaerts, et al., 2010: 130; Lecours, 2002: 100-102) . As such, these forums not only offer opportunities to engage in multilateral decision-making and networking, but can contribute to strengthening territorial identity and nation-building. Climate and energy policy may be especially open to territorial politics; political leaders can make emotive associations with 'our' land and seas that are being exploited and polluted, or 'our' natural resources which are being harnessed. Territorial identity is collectively constructed and reinforced within such political discourse, and is also an expression of how individuals define themselves and their relationships with others. A population with a strong and distinctive sense of shared identity can represent a less tangible but tremendous resource to a government, or a movement, seeking to mobilize support for an ambitious policy agenda, because of the feelings of solidarity and mutual trust such identity can generate (Calhoun, 1994; Guibernau, 1999; McEwen, 2005) Thus, existing literature points towards several factors that underpin pioneering behaviour in national climate policy, and we anticipate that these also motivate sub-state policy actors.
Ambitious policy-making is easier to achieve with the constitutional and fiscal capacity to support innovation. Sub-state governments producing policy outputs focused on low carbon futures may, like their national counterparts, be motivated by material incentives to promote key industries and export potential. And their policy programmes may be shaped and facilitated by close collaboration with non-governmental actors within the broader policy network, as well as the political pressure from environmentalists. However, sub-state governments are almost always constitutionally weaker than states, with a more limited range of policy and fiscal capacities, usually weaker bureaucracies and information resource strengths, and an often greater susceptibility to economic and political pressures from national and international developments (Keating and McEwen, 2005: 414-5) . They are compelled and constrained by a multi-level political and institutional environment, though they may have additional non-constitutional and non-material resources at their disposal to aid policy innovation, including the shared solidarity and territorial distinctiveness that comes from being a sub-state nation or region within a larger polity. The explanatory power of each of these factors will be assessed in relation to our Scottish case study, with a view to generating hypotheses that other scholars may wish to apply to broader comparative studies to explain why some sub-state nations and regions are climate pioneers while others may lag behind.
METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION
This article conducts a single case study of Scotland, a sub-state nation within the EU at the forefront of policy outputs directed towards climate change mitigation and renewable energy. Its action is far from unique. The existing literature documenting sub-state climate ambition has emerged mostly from the United States, where states from California to Vermont have developed their own carbon reduction schemes, or joined forces to co-ordinate their efforts. The most notable of these is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, involving nine north-east and mid-Atlantic states in a mandatory cap, reduce and trade scheme to lower carbon emissions (see Greenwald 2013; Kretzschmar and Whitford, 2012) . Globally, sub-state nations and regions committed to climate change mitigation have come together in groups such as the Climate Group States and Regions Alliance and the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4sd), both to share best practice and to lobby higher authorities for stronger action at the supranational and international levels (Happaerts, et al., 2010) . Involvement in such networks may reflect their lack of ability to influence national policy, but it nonetheless permits an international presence and profile. Many of Europe's leading regions are at the forefront of these organisations.
For example, the post of Catalan Minister for Territory and Sustainability goes hand in hand with being nrg4sd's co-chair for the North. Of the 23 full members of the Climate Group's States and Regions Alliance, 13 are in the EU, including strong identity nations and regions such as Catalonia, the Basque country, Bavaria, Brittany, Wales, as well as Scotland, with the Basque country acting as co-chair (Climate Group, 2011). These regions are implementing a range of innovative policies placing them at the forefront of climate action. The Basque country, for instance, introduced the first climate legislation in Spain as part of their comprehensive sustainable development strategy (Gobierno Vasco, 2011) . Similarly, both the Catalan and Bavarian governments have introduced a raft of policies designed to reduce energy demand and dependence on fossil fuels, or expand the use of renewables (Climate Group, 2012 ).
Yet, we know very little about the motivations that underpin such action on the part of sub-state nations and regions. Why do they act, in spite of their limited constitutional competence and capacity vis-à-vis national governments and the scale of the policy challenge? Why not cede the ground to national governments and supranational institutions? To help provide an explanation, we conduct a hypothesis-generating case study (Lijphart, 1971: 691) , or what Eckstein referred to as a heuristic case study (1975: 104) , of Scottish climate ambition in order to test some expectations and develop more robust hypotheses which can be utilized in comparative research.
Comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but we consider in the conclusion how the hypotheses generated from the Scottish case may be applied in a comparative context. The case study relies upon two main methods of data collection. First, we draw upon a wide range of documentary sources, including official policy documents, position papers, roadmaps and government reports, parliamentary debates and political speeches. Second, we conducted 35 semistructured elite interviews with serving and retired government ministers, officials in the Scottish and UK governments and the European Commission, and representatives from the broader policy community, including the regulator, the business community, and a very active energy charity/NGO sector. Interviews with officials were designed to enhance our knowledge of policy developments, to gain insight into the multi-level policy environment and intergovernmental negotiation, and to identify motivations underpinning policy goals. Interviews with policy actors from the broader policy community were intended to elicit the extent of engagement between these actors and the government, the degree of consensus underpinning policy outputs, and informed evaluation of the policies. Many of these were recorded, 5 and the resulting material was carefully analysed to help identify the extent to which policy outputs were underpinned by the factors outlined in our analytical framework.
EXPLAINING SCOTLAND AS CLIMATE PIONEER
In this section, we seek to understand why, in spite of its position as one small sub-state entity facing a global policy challenge, devolved Scotland has positioned itself as a frontrunner in devising policy outputs to reduce carbon emissions and dependence on fossil fuels. We draw upon the framework set out above to assess the relative influence of constitutional and fiscal capacities, economic motivations, policy networks, multi-level government and the politics of territorial identity.
Capacity for action
Governments seeking to engage in policy innovation require the capacity to make and implement policy decisions. In sub-state nations like Scotland, this capacity implies having the constitutional competence to make policy and legislative decisions, as well as the fiscal capacity to aid policy development, delivery and investment.
Under the terms of the devolution settlement, set out in the Scotland Act (1998), Scotland has full legislative and administrative competence in those areas that are not explicitly reserved to the Westminster parliament and government. This division of constitutional powers gives the Scottish Parliament and, hence, the Scottish government significant control over a range of domestic powers which might be deployed to mitigate climate change. These include environment, transport, waste management, rural affairs, land use, housing, planning regulations and the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Scottish autonomy is further enhanced by powers that have been 'executively devolved', which means the Scottish government has been given responsibility to make executive decisions on particular matters, but not the power to make new law. The most significant in this field are the powers conferred by the UK Electricity Act (1989), including the power to grant or withhold consent for the construction of overhead transmission lines and new electricity generation. The latter has been invoked by the SNP government in its pledge to prevent any new nuclear power stations being built on Scottish soil.
The Scottish government also negotiated discretion to modify the Renewables Obligation, currently the principal mechanism for promoting industry investment in renewable energy throughout the UK.
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There are, however, clear constitutional constraints, especially in relation to energy policy. The
Scotland Act reserved to Westminster: control over the generation, distribution, transmission and supply of electricity; the ownership and exploitation of oil, gas and coal; and nuclear energy and nuclear installations. As a result, the Scottish government can do little to influence the system of transmission charging, which it has frequently argued inhibits renewable energy investment by imposing the highest grid connection charges on those generating energy in regions remote from highly populated urban centres. In addition, the sea bed up to 12 nautical miles from the shoreline -the location of potential sites for offshore wind, wave and tidal power -is controlled by the Crown Estate. This is a commercial organization which manages the property owned by 'the Crown' on behalf of the UK. The Scottish government is dependent upon the Crown Estate's willingness to lease sites for offshore generation, and has criticized its (and effectively the UK Treasury's) capacity to claim tax and leasing revenues from offshore developments in Scottish seas.
There are also clear fiscal constraints resulting from limited fiscal autonomy, inhibiting the Scottish government's ability to invest in research and infrastructure to facilitate the transition to a low carbon economy, or use taxation to encourage investment or modify behavior through 'green' taxes. Tax revenue is collected centrally in the UK, and around 90 percent of the Scottish government's budget comes in the form of a direct transfer -the Scottish block grant -from the UK Treasury (see Bell and Christie, 2007) . The Scotland Act (2012), when fully implemented in 2015, will strengthen revenue-raising and borrowing capacity, but the overall effect is likely to be moderate rather than dramatic. Thus, the Scottish government remains dependent on the UK government for financial resources, for example, to support carbon capture and storage. The UK government and the energy regulator also oversee those regulatory policies designed to boost private investment in renewable energy.
These constraints have not prevented the Scottish government from pursuing an ambitious climate change and renewable energy programme, nor from promoting its ambitions nationally and internationally, but they have necessitated close collaboration and negotiation with UK authorities.
Such collaboration is reported as cordial and positive (interviews with officials in Scottish government and DECC, 22-28 September 2011), but it remains informal; intergovernmental coordination remains characterized by low levels of institutionalization (McEwen et al, 2012) . In pursuing its broader agenda for constitutional change, aimed at enhancing Scottish selfgovernment, the SNP government has prioritized more powers over energy policy. For example, following its re-election in 2011, the SNP demanded (unsuccessfully thus far) that the powers of to promote the deployment of marine renewables in Scotland, and a variety of funds to promote community energy and carbon reduction initiatives (Scottish Government, 2011b) . Thus, the Scottish government has faced both constitutional and fiscal constraints on its capacity for action, but these have not deterred it from pursuing ambitious policy goals.
Economic Motivations
Pioneering behaviour in energy and climate change has been associated with high levels of economic development, and a capacity to invest financially in low carbon technological (Swinney, 2007) .
Moreover, the Scottish government has estimated that achieving the 2020 renewables targets could provide 'up to 40,000 jobs and generate £30bn investment to the Scottish economy ' (Scottish government, 2011b: 9) . Although the absolute totals may be challenged, the scale of economic opportunity is largely supported by independent and industry estimates (Skills Development Offshore Valuation Study, 2010) .
It is notable, too, that when promoting renewable energy, the SNP government has frequently drawn parallels with the discovery of North Sea oil, the exploitation of which remains central to the SNP's economic and territorial objectives, as discussed below. Speaking at the launch of the Saltire Prize in Washington DC, First Minister Alex Salmond (2008) noted: 40 years ago, with the discovery of oil in the North Sea off Scotland's coast, Scotland won the natural lottery… And we are fortunate that Scotland's energy resources go far beyond hydrocarbons… Our powerful waters and our driving offshore winds are key to our future prosperity… we have won the natural lottery once again.
Renewable energy, like oil, is seen as a rich resource to be exploited for economic gain, as much if not more than an opportunity to fulfil low carbon ambitions. Indeed, that a low carbon agenda is pursued alongside a continued desire to exploit fossil fuels reveals that environmental concerns are not the principal driver of Scotland's renewable energy programme.
A Distinctive Policy Network
Existing studies have pointed to the influence of environmental activists and other civil society actors from the scientific and business community, in encouraging and fostering innovation climate and energy policy (Scruggs 2003; Lenschow, et al, 2005; Lieffering, et al., 2009) . of government-network engagement may reflect the lack of policy capacity within the government bureaucracy, and thus a dependence on outside expertise. However, it also suggests the extent to which government, the business and scientific community are united in their shared ambition and endeavour towards a low carbon future. Such informal bargaining and consensus building reflect a form of networking often found among environmental pioneers states. What makes this case distinctive is the territorial scale at which this network operates, and the clear steer given to it by the Scottish government.
Multi-level Drivers
The existing literature suggests that environmental pioneers are engaged in a 'two-level game', focused not just on innovation at home, but also on pushing for change at a higher level. Within the EU, pioneers have sought to upload their preferences to supranational and international fora, both to minimize their own adjustment costs and maximize their competitive advantage. In the US, the federal government's climate inaction led to a blossoming of innovation among US states.
While our case study revealed the importance of multi-level drivers, their effect was distinctive. In contrast to the United States, Scottish climate action has not emerged in the face of inaction by either the UK government or the EU. At least with respect to policy discourse, outputs and international engagement, the UK government has itself been at the forefront of climate mitigation, even if domestic policy outcomes have some way to go to achieve ambitions (Carter, 2008; Lovell, et al. 2009 ; Committee on Climate Change, 2012). The UK Climate Change Act in 2008 also has ambitious mandatory emissions reduction targets, alongside relatively ambitious renewable energy targets. The EU, meanwhile, has actively developed mandatory targets in emissions reductions, energy efficiency and renewable energy among its member-states, and has pushed for stricter regulations in international climate change negotiations. In short, Scottish action cannot be explained by the 'compensatory' dynamic which has been used to account for climate innovation among many US states and Canadian provinces.
Nonetheless, Scottish policy making is very much shaped and constrained by the multi-level context, which sees the Scottish government engaged in a three-level game, seeking to influence policy outputs of both the UK government and European Union. The constitutional constraints within which Scottish climate policy is made demand that the Scottish government lobby the UK government, the Crown Estate and Ofgem (the energy regulator) when attempting to shape the regulatory framework surrounding energy, and significant effort is invested in doing so ( as we look on the cusp of this energy revolution, there are huge bonuses in terms of jobs and technology and the economy. But the only organization that currently directly benefits from the use of resources on land, the sea, the waves and the winds is The Crown Estate… it seems to me self-evident that the revenues from The Crown Estate should flow to the Scottish Government, to the Scottish Parliament, to the Scottish people as an endowment, as opposed to the Treasury (Salmond, 2010a) .
In October 2011, the First Minister opened his speech to his party's conference on the issue of climate change -'the greatest issue facing this planet' -and used it as evidence of Scotland's selfgoverning potential: 'So, given that by international acclaim we have handled this mighty issue so well as a parliament, what possible argument could there be that the Scottish Parliament is not capable of discharging ALL of the issues facing the Scottish people?' (Salmond, 2011) .
Successful nationalist mobilization is often supported by the promise of economic prosperity (Keating, 2001) . The promotion of renewable energy as a route to re-industrialising Scotland is at least in part intended to fuel the demand for Scottish self-government, and to ease concerns about its economic consequences. In this regard, the frequent parallels drawn with the discovery of North Sea oil are notable. Just as oil was and remains a potent symbol of the SNP's economicallydriven nationalism, so too does renewable energy and the transition to a low carbon economy hold the promise of an independent Scotland with energy security and energy wealth. emerge in Scotland as a result of the inaction of the UK government or the EU; indeed they appear to be unrelated to the level of ambition evident at a higher level. The politics of renewable energy and climate change has offered the Scottish government the opportunity to assert its territorial distinctiveness on the national and international stage, and to use its policy levers to assert and reinforce the demand for self-government.
CONCLUSION
The policy ambitions highlighted in the Scottish case are part of a broader phenomenon: climate governance requires action on, and invites innovation across, multiple governmental scales (Ostrom, 2010) . Many sub-state governments have become increasingly bold, introducing policy initiatives neglected or absent at higher levels. Not all sub-state governments are pioneers, of course; some may be laggards, slowing the pace of climate change mitigation at the national level.
For instance, the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have at times played this role (Harrison, 2007) . All sub-state governments are affected, to some degree, by climate change, but many may be content to leave national and supranational institutions to set the policy agenda. In this concluding section, we use the findings of our case study to develop some hypotheses to explain why some sub-state governments have positioned themselves at the forefront of pioneering policy initiatives intended to mitigate climate change.
First, our case study, coupled with the broader literature, suggests that sub-state governments will be more likely to pursue ambitious policy goals when they have the constitutional capacity to develop distinctive policies, the fiscal capacity to invest, and the natural, renewable resource capacity to exploit. The latter may also be linked to economic motivations if resource capacity also brings advantages for manufacturing industries or home-based energy suppliers. Those sub-state nations and regions most active on the national and international stage -including Scotland, the Basque country, Catalonia, Flanders, Wallonia, North Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Quebec, British Columbia -are among the most powerful constitutionally, with high degrees of 'self-rule' (see Bruyninckx, et al., 2012) . Resource capacities and economic motivations are also evident in the capacity to exploit non-fossil fuels, for example the substantial existing hydro capacity in Scotland and Quebec, or to maximize the capacity for technological innovation and export, as in the case of the aforementioned German Länder. It might be expected that the presence or absence of oil reserves may also matter; the importance of the oil and gas industry in Alberta and Saskatchewan may be a factor in their reluctance to sign up to emissions reduction targets. What is intriguing about the Scottish case, however, is that it includes an embrace of both 'old' and 'new' energy: renewable energy and emissions reductions are pursued alongside the evident desire to reap the rewards (following independence) of North Sea oil.
Our case study, and a glance at the most prominent players in the networks of regional governments discussed above, also suggests that strong identity nations and regions may be more likely than weak identity regions to pursue ambitious climate action. Although many strong identity regions are also strong constitutionally -potentially making it difficult to disentangle these variables -we can point to examples of pioneering climate action amongst strong identity regions with relatively weak constitutional capacity. Brittany and Wales, for example, have low 'self-rule' but nonetheless ambitious agendas. In Brittany, this has been evident in an ambitions for offshore renewables, energy efficiency programmes and investment in small scale renewable development through a unique public-private partnership fund (the Eilañ). In Wales, the devolved administration has carved out a distinctive profile in sustainable development, especially relating to international development, and has a statutory duty to promote sustainability (Royles, 2012) .
There are two reasons why strong identity nations and regions may be found among climate pioneers. First, territorial distinctiveness can be a resource to help generate solidarity and consent among key players within a broader policy network, as well as among the broader public, potentially helping to overcome more formal capacity constraints. Second, sub-state nations and regions in the EU are bound by the targets and directives set at EU level. They cannot legally refuse to implement these agreements; either they or their member state would pay a heavy financial price for failing to fulfill EU obligations. Thus, the most effective way that a sub-state government seeking to assert territorial distinctiveness can do so in this policy arena is through demonstrating ambition by exceeding national and international targets.
Broader political factors may also underpin sub-state climate ambitions. Just as the presence of electorally strong green parties and green lobbies may foster environmental ambition at the national level, so too may we expect green party strength to correlate with sub-state ambition, as has been the case at both governmental levels in Germany. Green parties, however, are not especially strong among sub-state governments, pioneering or otherwise. The Scottish case study points towards other party political factors, suggesting a link between the pursuit of ambitious provides an opportunity to nurture perceptions of national prosperity and self-sufficiency, and to engage in 'paradiplomacy' to assert national autonomy and nurture their perception internationally as 'nation-states in waiting' (Lecours, 2002; Cornago, 2010) .
Conversely, climate ambition can provide opportunities for those resisting self-government demands by enabling them to assert territorial distinctiveness on the national and international stage through non-constitutional means, but without the need for political independence. The climate leadership demonstrated by the former Quebec Liberal Premier, Jean Charest, both nationally and internationally, provides a useful example of a government keen to assert its national distinctiveness and autonomy while opposing the pro-sovereignty position of its main
Parti Québécois rival. The socialist Basque government, in power until 2012, like its nationalist predecessor was also active in the international climate arena in recent years, and used the opportunities of office to assert Basque leadership by developing a more overtly ambitious and extensive sustainable development strategy (Galarraga, 2011; de la Peña Varona and Barcena Hinojal, 2012) . In sub-state nations such as these, the desire to enhance distinctiveness and political autonomy is ever-present, and manifests itself in climate ambition, even if the goal of constitutional independence is in dispute. Thus, the presence of a strong autonomist party -in government or challenging government from the opposition benches -may be the key driver. Such a party can impose on the government, irrespective of the party in power, the need to be seen to defend and promote territorial interests, assert territorial distinctiveness and maximize decisionmaking autonomy. Pioneering climate action is but one avenue to pursue these broader political aims.
Testing the validity of these hypotheses obviously requires further comparative analysis, and is beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear, however, is that sub-state governments have emerged as significant players in this policy arena, and their action merits close academic scrutiny.
The framework and case study offered above are intended to provide a first step in this endeavour.
